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2005-10-25Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/3920
Aid Effectiveness and Limited EnforceableConditionality
dc.contributor.authorScholl, Almuth
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:00:39Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:00:39Z
dc.date.created2005-10-27
dc.date.issued2005-10-25
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4572
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleAid Effectiveness and Limited EnforceableConditionality
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10051315
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3920
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.pages48
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2005
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2005,54

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