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2006-01-26Buch DOI: 10.18452/3936
Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares
dc.contributor.authorBental, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:03:48Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:03:48Z
dc.date.created2006-02-09
dc.date.issued2006-01-26
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4588
dc.description.abstractWe use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard andholdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargainingpower balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improvedmonitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment,profits and rents. The model’s predictions are consistentwith the recent evolution of labor shares, wages per efficiency unitsand the ratio of labor in efficiency units to capital in several OECDcountries. The model suggests further that improvement in monitoringmay also play a key role in understanding opposition to institutionalreforms in the labor market.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectmoral hazardeng
dc.subjecthold upeng
dc.subjectbargainingeng
dc.subjectlabor shareeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleInstitutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10057474
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3936
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages26
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2006
local.edoc.container-issue9
local.edoc.container-year2006
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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