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2006-03-03Buch DOI: 10.18452/3949
Cheap Talk in the Classroom
dc.contributor.authorMechtenberg, Lydia
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:06:30Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:06:30Z
dc.date.created2006-04-05
dc.date.issued2006-03-03
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4601
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I offer a theoretical explanation of the robust gender differences in educational achievement distributions of school children. I consider a one shot cheap talk game with two different types of senders (biased teachers and fair teachers), two types of receivers("normal" and "special" pupils) and uncertainty about the sender typeon the side of the receiver. I demonstrate that the group of pupilswho, in expectation, get either too much or too little encouragementwill have less top achievers and a lower average achievement than thegroup of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message, even if theprior talent distribution is the same for both groups of pupils.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectEducationeng
dc.subjectCheap talkeng
dc.subjectDiscriminationeng
dc.subjectGendereng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCheap Talk in the Classroom
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10062267
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3949
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages29
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2006
local.edoc.container-issue19
local.edoc.container-year2006
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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