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2006-04-07Buch DOI: 10.18452/3957
Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
dc.contributor.authorDeffains, Bruno
dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:08:05Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:08:05Z
dc.date.created2006-05-05
dc.date.issued2006-04-07
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4609
dc.description.abstractWe compare the effect of legal and institutional competition for the design of labor institutions in an environment characterized by holdup problems in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with the two country case, assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case, a competition of systems reduces welfare while in the latter it improves the overall outcome.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleInstitutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10063316
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/3957
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages26
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2006
local.edoc.container-issue27
local.edoc.container-year2006
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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