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2006-12-18Buch DOI: 10.18452/4015
Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion
dc.contributor.authorKragl, Jenny
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, Julia
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:19:51Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:19:51Z
dc.date.created2007-01-03
dc.date.issued2006-12-18
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4667
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent´s individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectPrincipal-Agenteng
dc.subjectRelational Contracteng
dc.subjectInequity Aversioneng
dc.subjectEnvyeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleRelational Contracts and Inequity Aversion
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10072214
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4015
dc.subject.dnb17 Wirtschaft
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages23
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2006
local.edoc.container-issue85
local.edoc.container-year2006
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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