Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion
dc.contributor.author | Kragl, Jenny | |
dc.contributor.author | Schmid, Julia | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-15T23:19:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-15T23:19:51Z | |
dc.date.created | 2007-01-03 | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-12-18 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1860-5664 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4667 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent´s individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |
dc.subject | Principal-Agent | eng |
dc.subject | Relational Contract | eng |
dc.subject | Inequity Aversion | eng |
dc.subject | Envy | eng |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 Wirtschaft | |
dc.title | Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion | |
dc.type | book | |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10072214 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4015 | |
dc.subject.dnb | 17 Wirtschaft | |
local.edoc.container-title | Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko | |
local.edoc.pages | 23 | |
local.edoc.type-name | Buch | |
local.edoc.container-type | series | |
local.edoc.container-type-name | Schriftenreihe | |
local.edoc.container-volume | 2006 | |
local.edoc.container-issue | 85 | |
local.edoc.container-year | 2006 | |
local.edoc.container-erstkatid | 2195055-6 |