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2007-08-01Buch DOI: 10.18452/4064
Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anja
dc.contributor.authorThiele, Veikko
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:29:48Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:29:48Z
dc.date.created2007-08-31
dc.date.issued2007-08-01
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4716
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to promote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than predicted by theory. Furthermore, optimally trading off incentive and selection issues causes a form of the Peter Principle: The less suitable agent has an inefficiently high probability of promotion.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectPromotion Tournamentseng
dc.subjectPiece Rateseng
dc.subjectHidden Characteristicseng
dc.subjectHidden Actioneng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titlePromotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10079445
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4064
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages31
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2007
local.edoc.container-issue45
local.edoc.container-year2007
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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