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2009-01-22Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/4171
Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Roland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:51:31Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:51:31Z
dc.date.created2009-01-29
dc.date.issued2009-01-22
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4823
dc.description.abstractThe paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator’s objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator’s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of the aggregate demand function. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk exactly when demand is convex. 4) Consumers’ risk preferences tend to contradict the firm’s. 5) Benevolent regulators always prefer regulatory risk and these preferences may contradict both the firm’s and consumers’ preferences.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectoptimal incentive regulationeng
dc.subjectregulatory riskeng
dc.subjectprocurementeng
dc.subjectinformation rentseng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleRegulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10095746
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4171
local.edoc.pages32
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2009
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2009,6

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