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2009-07-31Buch DOI: 10.18452/4204
Regulation and Investment in Network Industries
dc.contributor.authorGrajek, Michał
dc.contributor.authorRöller, Lars-Hendrik
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:58:12Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:58:12Z
dc.date.created2010-05-21
dc.date.issued2009-07-31
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4856
dc.description.abstractWe provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants’ and incumbents’ investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents’ investments encourage provision of regulated access.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectInvestmenteng
dc.subjectTelecommunicationseng
dc.subjectAccess Regulationeng
dc.subjectUnbundlingeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleRegulation and Investment in Network Industries
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleEvidence from European Telecoms
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100110671
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4204
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages31
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2009
local.edoc.container-issue39
local.edoc.container-year2009
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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