Show simple item record

2009-08-14Buch DOI: 10.18452/4205
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Roland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-15T23:58:24Z
dc.date.available2017-06-15T23:58:24Z
dc.date.created2010-05-21
dc.date.issued2009-08-14
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4857
dc.description.abstractI investigate the argument that, in a two–party system with different regulatory objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output–expansion effect that benefits one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small or the winning probability of the regulatory–risk–averse party is not too large. Because of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regulatory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectregulationeng
dc.subjectregulatory riskeng
dc.subjectpolitical economyeng
dc.subjectindependent regulatory agencyeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100110689
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4205
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages29
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2009
local.edoc.container-issue40
local.edoc.container-year2009
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

Show simple item record