2010-01-20Buch DOI: 10.18452/4235
The market for Rating Agencies
Fasten, Erik R.
Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained.
Dateien zu dieser Publikation
Is Part Of Series: Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko - 7, SFB 649 Papers, ISSN:1860-5664