Two-sided Certification
dc.contributor.author | Fasten, Erik R. | |
dc.contributor.author | Hofmann, Dirk | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-16T00:04:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-16T00:04:36Z | |
dc.date.created | 2010-05-26 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-01-20 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1860-5664 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4887 | |
dc.description.abstract | Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject | Certification | eng |
dc.subject | Rating Agencies | eng |
dc.subject | Asymmetric Information | eng |
dc.subject | Financial Markets | eng |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 Wirtschaft | |
dc.title | Two-sided Certification | |
dc.type | workingPaper | |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100111203 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4235 | |
local.edoc.pages | 44 | |
local.edoc.type-name | Diskussionspapier | |
local.edoc.container-type | series | |
local.edoc.container-type-name | Schriftenreihe | |
local.edoc.container-year | 2010 | |
dc.title.subtitle | The market for Rating Agencies | |
dc.identifier.zdb | 2195055-6 | |
bua.series.name | Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko | |
bua.series.issuenumber | 2010,7 |