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2010-01-20Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/4235
Two-sided Certification
dc.contributor.authorFasten, Erik R.
dc.contributor.authorHofmann, Dirk
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:04:36Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:04:36Z
dc.date.created2010-05-26
dc.date.issued2010-01-20
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4887
dc.description.abstractCertifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectCertificationeng
dc.subjectRating Agencieseng
dc.subjectAsymmetric Informationeng
dc.subjectFinancial Marketseng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleTwo-sided Certification
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100111203
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4235
local.edoc.pages44
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2010
dc.title.subtitleThe market for Rating Agencies
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2010,7

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