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2010-12-21Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/4288
Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching
dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Lars
dc.contributor.authorRitschl, Albrecht
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:15:34Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:15:34Z
dc.date.created2011-04-06
dc.date.issued2010-12-21
dc.date.submitted2010-12-21
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4940
dc.description.abstractCommunal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European merchants in the absence of modern enforcement technologies. This paper shows how this mechanism helps to overcome enforcement problems in anonymous buyer/seller transactions. In a village economy version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, agents trading anonymously in decentralized markets can be identified by their citizenship and thus be held liable for each other. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis easily extends itself to other payment systems like credit cards that provide a group identity to otherwise anonymous agents.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectCommunal responsibilityeng
dc.subjectanonymous matchingeng
dc.subjectmoney demandeng
dc.subjectcrediteng
dc.subjectbills of exchangeeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCommunal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money and Credit Under Anonymous Matching
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100185099
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4288
local.edoc.pages40
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2010
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2010,60

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