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2011-03-03Buch DOI: 10.18452/4302
A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission
dc.contributor.authorMechtenberg, Lydia
dc.contributor.authorMünster, Johannes
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:18:22Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:18:22Z
dc.date.created2011-04-19
dc.date.issued2011-03-03
dc.date.submitted2011-03-03
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4954
dc.description.abstractThis note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectCommunicationeng
dc.subjectInformationeng
dc.subjectCheap talkeng
dc.subjectMediationeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleA strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100185790
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4302
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages16
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2011
local.edoc.container-issue12
local.edoc.container-year2011
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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