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2011-07-28Buch DOI: 10.18452/4335
Bargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model
dc.contributor.authorFiocco, Raffaele
dc.contributor.authorGilli, Mario
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:25:17Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:25:17Z
dc.date.created2011-08-09
dc.date.issued2011-07-28
dc.date.submitted2011-07-28
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/4987
dc.description.abstractWithin a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent prin- cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the …rm’s (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mecha- nism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the gains of collusion with the …rm. The novelty of this paper is that both the regulatory mechanism and the side contracting between the agency and the …rm are modelled as a bargaining process. While as usual the ine¢ cient …rm does not have any interest in cost manipulation, we …nd that the e¢ cient …rm has an incentive to collude only if the agency’s bargaining power is high enough, and the total gains of collusion are now lower than those the two partners would appropriate if the agency could make a take-it-or- leave-it o¤er. Then, we focus on the optimal institutional responses to the possibility of collusion. In our setting, where the incomplete- ness of contracts prevents the principal from designing of a screening mechanism and thus Tirole’s equivalence principle does not apply, we show how the players’bargaining powers crucially drive the optimal response to collusion.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectregulationeng
dc.subjectbargainingeng
dc.subjectcollusioneng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleBargaining and Collusion in a Regulatory Model
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100190502
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4335
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages31
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2011
local.edoc.container-issue47
local.edoc.container-year2011
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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