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2011-11-30Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/4372
Competition and regulation in a differentiated good market
dc.contributor.authorFiocco, Raffaele
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:32:50Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:32:50Z
dc.date.created2011-12-08
dc.date.issued2011-11-30
dc.date.submitted2011-11-30
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5024
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the issue of how to design the institutional structure of an industry which provides two differentiated products. One good is supplied by a regulated monopoly and the other is produced in a competitive (unregulated) segment. Two possible institutional patterns are compared. Under "concentration" the regulated firm can enter the competitive segment by owning one firm which operates there (even though the two firms must be legally unbundled). Theregime of "separation" implies that regulated activities are totally unbundled from the unregulated ones, that is, common ownership is not allowed. When the regulator does not know the regulated monopoly's cost of production, we find that the pattern of separation improves (expected) social welfare as long as goods are substitutes. Conversely, concentration performs better in case of complementarity.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcompetitioneng
dc.subjectregulationeng
dc.subjectconcentrationeng
dc.subjectcomplementarityeng
dc.subjectseparationeng
dc.subjectsubstitutabilityeng
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCompetition and regulation in a differentiated good market
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100197060
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4372
local.edoc.pages40
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2011
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2011,84

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