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2012-10-12Buch DOI: 10.18452/4432
Cartelization Through Buyer Groups
dc.contributor.authorDoyle, Chris
dc.contributor.authorHan, Martijn A.
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T00:44:50Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T00:44:50Z
dc.date.created2012-11-16
dc.date.issued2012-10-12
dc.date.submitted2012-10-12
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5084
dc.description.abstractRetailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to credibly commit to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an “implied cartel” depends on the retailers’ incentives to secretly source from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectcollusioneng
dc.subjectbuyer groupseng
dc.subjectexclusive dealingeng
dc.subjectminimum purchase clauseseng
dc.subjectrebateseng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCartelization Through Buyer Groups
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100205759
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4432
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages28
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2012
local.edoc.container-issue59
local.edoc.container-year2012
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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