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2014-09-03Buch DOI: 10.18452/4528
Certification and MarketTransparency
dc.contributor.authorStahl, Konrad
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Roland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:04:11Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:04:11Z
dc.date.created2014-09-12
dc.date.issued2014-09-03
dc.date.submitted2014-09-03
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5180
dc.description.abstractWe provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare. Under buyer-certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency, but because seller-certification yields larger profits, active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed. These findings are robust and widely applicable to, for instance, patents, automotive parts, and financial products.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectMarket Transparencyeng
dc.subjectCertificationeng
dc.subjectInformation and Product Qualityeng
dc.subjectAsymmetric Informationeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCertification and MarketTransparency
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100220196
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4528
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages44
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue41
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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