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2014-09-05Buch DOI: 10.18452/4531
On the Timing of ClimateAgreements
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Robert
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Roland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:04:47Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:04:47Z
dc.date.created2014-09-12
dc.date.issued2014-09-05
dc.date.submitted2014-09-05
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5183
dc.description.abstractA central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green- house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi- lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con- trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectclimate treatyeng
dc.subjectabatementeng
dc.subjectlong-term cooperationeng
dc.subjectspillovereng
dc.subjectstrategic delayeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleOn the Timing of ClimateAgreements
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100220220
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4531
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages43
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue44
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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