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2014-09-05Buch DOI: 10.18452/4533
Ex post information rentsin sequential screening
dc.contributor.authorKrähmer, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Roland
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:05:13Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:05:13Z
dc.date.created2014-09-12
dc.date.issued2014-09-05
dc.date.submitted2014-09-05
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5185
dc.description.abstractWe study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectinformation rentseng
dc.subjectsequential screeningeng
dc.subjectinformation disclosureeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleEx post information rentsin sequential screening
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100220249
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4533
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages40
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue46
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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