Ex post information rentsin sequential screening
dc.contributor.author | Krähmer, Daniel | |
dc.contributor.author | Strausz, Roland | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-16T01:05:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-16T01:05:13Z | |
dc.date.created | 2014-09-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-09-05 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2014-09-05 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1860-5664 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5185 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling. | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject | information rents | eng |
dc.subject | sequential screening | eng |
dc.subject | information disclosure | eng |
dc.subject.ddc | 310 Sammlungen allgemeiner Statistiken | |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 Wirtschaft | |
dc.title | Ex post information rentsin sequential screening | |
dc.type | workingPaper | |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100220249 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4533 | |
local.edoc.pages | 40 | |
local.edoc.type-name | Diskussionspapier | |
local.edoc.container-type | series | |
local.edoc.container-type-name | Schriftenreihe | |
local.edoc.container-year | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.zdb | 2195055-6 | |
bua.series.name | Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko | |
bua.series.issuenumber | 2014,46 |