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2014-10-29Buch DOI: 10.18452/4551
Whom are you talkingwith?
dc.contributor.authorGrandjean, Giles
dc.contributor.authorMantovani, Marco
dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Ana
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:08:53Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:08:53Z
dc.date.created2015-05-07
dc.date.issued2014-10-29
dc.date.submitted2014-10-29
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5203
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectcheap talkger
dc.subjectcoordinationger
dc.subjectcoalitionsger
dc.subjectexperimentger
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleWhom are you talkingwith?
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleAn experiment oncredibility andcommunication structure
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100229584
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4551
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages52
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue64
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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