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2014-11-20Buch DOI: 10.18452/4556
When the Taylor principle isinsufficient
dc.contributor.authorBrede, Maria
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:09:55Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:09:55Z
dc.date.created2015-05-07
dc.date.issued2014-11-20
dc.date.submitted2014-11-20
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5208
dc.description.abstractThis paper derives restrictions on monetary and fiscal policies for determinate equilibria in a two-country monetary union with autarkic members. It finds that a central bank following the Taylor principle may not be suffcient for determinacy unless accompanied by one 'active' fiscal authority in the sense of Leeper (1991). Alternatively, both fiscal authorities can be 'active' while the central bank abandons the Taylor principle. The two determinate equilibria have significantly different implications for the transmission of fiscal and monetary shocks and for the fiscal theory of the price level in a monetary union.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectFiscal theoryeng
dc.subjectmonetary unioneng
dc.subjectpolicy coordinationeng
dc.subjectindeterminacyeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleWhen the Taylor principle isinsufficient
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleA benchmarkfor the fiscal theory of theprice level in a monetaryunion
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100229634
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4556
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages13
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue69
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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