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2014-11-24Buch DOI: 10.18452/4557
The Politics ofRelated Lending
dc.contributor.authorHalling, Michael
dc.contributor.authorPichler, Pegaret
dc.contributor.authorStomper, Alex
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:10:07Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:10:07Z
dc.date.created2015-05-07
dc.date.issued2014-11-24
dc.date.submitted2014-11-24
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5209
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.ger
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.subjectpolitics and financeeng
dc.subjectbank regulationeng
dc.subjectrelated lendingeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Statistik
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleThe Politics ofRelated Lending
dc.typebook
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100229640
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4557
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages51
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2014
local.edoc.container-issue70
local.edoc.container-year2014
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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