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2016-08-29Buch DOI: 10.18452/4636
Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard?
dc.contributor.authorAngelova, Vera
dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:26:46Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:26:46Z
dc.date.created2017-02-08
dc.date.issued2016-08-29
dc.date.submitted2016-08-29
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5288
dc.description.abstractInteractions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. We observe a positive effect on the rate of truthful advice when the bonus creates multiple opportunities to reciprocate, that is, when the bonus is combined with identifiability (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to have several clients who may reciprocate within one period). Moreover, identifiability significantly increases truth-telling under competition.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectcompetitioneng
dc.subjectasymmetric informationeng
dc.subjectreputationeng
dc.subjectreciprocityeng
dc.subjectexperimentseng
dc.subjectexpert serviceseng
dc.subjectdeceptioneng
dc.subjectvoluntary paymenteng
dc.subjectprincipal-agenteng
dc.subjectsender-receiver gameeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Sammlungen allgemeiner Statistiken
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleCan a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard?
dc.typebook
dc.subtitleAn Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100243752
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4636
local.edoc.container-titleSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
local.edoc.pages44
local.edoc.type-nameBuch
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-volume2016
local.edoc.container-issue27
local.edoc.container-year2016
local.edoc.container-erstkatid2195055-6

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