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2016-08-29Diskussionspapier DOI: 10.18452/4637
Relative Performance of Liability Rules
dc.contributor.authorAngelova, Vera
dc.contributor.authorAttanasi, Giuseppe
dc.contributor.authorHiriart, Yolande
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-16T01:26:58Z
dc.date.available2017-06-16T01:26:58Z
dc.date.created2017-02-13
dc.date.issued2016-08-29
dc.date.submitted2016-08-29
dc.identifier.issn1860-5664
dc.identifier.urihttp://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/5289
dc.description.abstractWe compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm’s investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We determine the investment in safety under No Liability, Strict Liability and Negligence, and compare it to the first best. Additionally, we investigate how the (dis)ability of the firm to fully cover potential damages affects the firm’s behavior. An experiment tests the theoretical predictions. In line with theory, Strict Liability and Negligence are equally effective; both perform better than No Liability; investment in safety is not sensitive to the ability of the firm to compensate potential victims. In contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are much higher and liability is much less effective than predicted.eng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectExperimenteng
dc.subjectRisk Regulationeng
dc.subjectLiability Ruleseng
dc.subjectIncentiveseng
dc.subjectInsolvencyeng
dc.subject.ddc310 Sammlungen allgemeiner Statistiken
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaft
dc.titleRelative Performance of Liability Rules
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100243895
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.18452/4637
local.edoc.pages44
local.edoc.type-nameDiskussionspapier
local.edoc.container-typeseries
local.edoc.container-type-nameSchriftenreihe
local.edoc.container-year2016
dc.title.subtitleExperimental Evidence
dc.identifier.zdb2195055-6
bua.series.nameSonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
bua.series.issuenumber2016,28

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