Mortality and Death
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Department
Philosophische Fakultät
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Abstract
Der Tod einer Person (ein Ereignis) und ihre Sterblichkeit (eine Eigenschaft) sind nicht dasselbe, hängen aber klarerweise zusammen. Angenommen der Tod einer Person ist schlecht für diese – was bedeutet dies dann für die Bewertung ihrer Sterblichkeit? Um diese Frage zu beantworten muss unterschieden werden zwischen zwei verschiedenen Arten von Sterblichkeit: Die kontingente Sterblichkeit („sterben können“) ist die dispositionale Eigenschaft eines Lebewesens unter bestimmten Umständen zu sterben. Der Tod des Lebewesens ist die Manifestation dieser Disposition. Die notwendige Sterblichkeit andererseits („sterben müssen“) ist die (Meta-)Eigenschaft eines Lebwesens eine begrenzte Lebenserwartung zu haben – das heißt, eine Disposition zu sterben zu haben, die notwendigerweise irgendwann manifestiert wird. Der werttheoretische Zusammenhang zwischen Tod und Sterblichkeit ergibt sich plausiblerweise aus den Rollen, die kontingente und notwendige Sterblichkeit beim Zustandekommen des Todes einer Person spielen: Es zeigt sich, dass die Disposition zu sterben den Tod der Person ermöglicht. Dadurch macht sie einen kausal relevanten Unterschied im Auftreten eines für diese Person schlechten Ereignisses und beeinflusst so ihr Wohlergehen. Deshalb ist die kontingente Sterblichkeit schlecht für die Person – und diese Schlechtigkeit erbt sie von dem Ereignis des Todes. Steht dieses Ereignis allerdings noch nicht fest, erbt die kontingente Sterblichkeit stattdessen einen Teil des erwarteten Unwerts des Todes. Die notwendige Sterblichkeit andererseits erbt einen Teil des generellen Unwerts des Todes (verstanden als Ereignistyp), weil sie das Eintreten eines solchen Ereignisses vorwegnimmt, indem sie garantiert, dass ein Ereignis dieses Typs eintreten muss. Gleichzeitig scheint die notwendige Sterblichkeit ihrerseits die Evaluation des Todes (und somit auch der kontingenten Sterblichkeit) zu beeinflussen: Der Tod einer Person wirkt weniger tragisch, wenn sie notwendig sterblich ist.
The death of a person (an event) and her mortality (a property) are not the same but nevertheless clearly related. Assuming that a person’s death is bad for her, one may ask what this would mean for the evaluation of her mortality. To answer this question, one must distinguish between two different kinds of mortality: Contingent mortality (“being able to die”) is the dispositional property of a living being to die under certain circumstances. The death of the being is the manifestation of this disposition. Necessary mortality on the other hand (“having to die”) is the (meta-)property of a living being to have a limited life-expectancy, that is, to have a disposition to die that is necessarily manifested eventually. The evaluative connection between death and mortality can plausibly be derived from the roles that a person’s contingent and necessary mortality play in the occurrence of her death: It turns out that the disposition to die is an enabling condition for the person’s death. This means that it makes a causally relevant difference in the occurrence of an event that is bad for the person and thereby genuinely and negatively affects her wellbeing. Therefore, her contingent mortality is bad for the person – and this badness is derived from the badness of the event of her death. If this event is not yet settled, the contingent mortality inherits a part of the expected disvalue of the person’s death instead. Her necessary mortality on the other hand inherits part of the general disvalue of the person’s death (understood as a type of event) because it anticipates the occurrence of such an event by guaranteeing that an event of this type must occur. At the same time, the presence of a person’s necessary mortality seems to affect the evaluation of her death (and thereby also her contingent mortality): A person’s death appears less tragic if she is necessarily mortal.
The death of a person (an event) and her mortality (a property) are not the same but nevertheless clearly related. Assuming that a person’s death is bad for her, one may ask what this would mean for the evaluation of her mortality. To answer this question, one must distinguish between two different kinds of mortality: Contingent mortality (“being able to die”) is the dispositional property of a living being to die under certain circumstances. The death of the being is the manifestation of this disposition. Necessary mortality on the other hand (“having to die”) is the (meta-)property of a living being to have a limited life-expectancy, that is, to have a disposition to die that is necessarily manifested eventually. The evaluative connection between death and mortality can plausibly be derived from the roles that a person’s contingent and necessary mortality play in the occurrence of her death: It turns out that the disposition to die is an enabling condition for the person’s death. This means that it makes a causally relevant difference in the occurrence of an event that is bad for the person and thereby genuinely and negatively affects her wellbeing. Therefore, her contingent mortality is bad for the person – and this badness is derived from the badness of the event of her death. If this event is not yet settled, the contingent mortality inherits a part of the expected disvalue of the person’s death instead. Her necessary mortality on the other hand inherits part of the general disvalue of the person’s death (understood as a type of event) because it anticipates the occurrence of such an event by guaranteeing that an event of this type must occur. At the same time, the presence of a person’s necessary mortality seems to affect the evaluation of her death (and thereby also her contingent mortality): A person’s death appears less tragic if she is necessarily mortal.
Description
Keywords
Werttheorie, Tod, Sterblichkeit, Übel des Todes, Disposition, Kontingente Sterblichkeit, Notwendige Sterblichkeit, Metaphysik, Value Theory, Death, Mortality, Evil of Death, Disposition, Contingent Mortality, Necessary Mortality, Metaphysics
Dewey Decimal Classification
170 Ethik (Moralphilosophie), 110 Metaphysik
Citation
Parmer, Berit.(2022). Mortality and Death. 10.18452/24321